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9IBIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
explained in these terms. Considering the fact that the subject of
gambling had for almost three centuries been governed in Massachu-
setts by a comprehensive statutory system, it seems logical for the court
to infer that the legislature meant to allow pin-ball machines when it
omitted mentioning them in the category of prohibited forms of gam-
bling.22 In another situation where the legislative history on the
subject is not so long or thorough and the statute is phrased in different
language, a court may just as reasonably decide that the intent was to
affect only those subjects specifically covered. A recent District Court
of Appeals case in California 23 on this same subject, pin-ball machines,
so held, seemingly on this basis. 24
From this view of the subject the conclusion seems inescapable that
the term "conflict" has taken on. so many contexts from its uses in
various situations by different courts that in this field it no longer has
any precise meaning. Courts probably could, by refraining from the
indiscriminate use of the term to cover all situations and by using more
exact language, clarify the situation considerably. Legislatures could
and should indicate in some discernable manner their intent as to
whether or not their legislation covers the entire field in such a way
as to make local regulations conflicting. Local and state enforcement
officials, it seems, can only observe the versions laid down by their
particular controlling courts and apply them as closely as possible to
the fact situation in hand.
ROBERT C. BLOCK.
Private Communications with Grand Juries
The grand jury is the last stronghold of the laymen's initiative in
criminal law. It has enormous powers which it seldom exercises because
its members have not been made aware of the full extent of a grand
jury's powers. Acting on its own initiative, or directed by an aggressive
prosecutor, the grand jury is able to make itself feared and respected
by all lawless elements of the community as well as by public officials who
neglect or refuse to perform the functions of their office.
During the past several years, many attacks have been made on the
grand jury, some going so far as to advocate its complete abolition.1 The
grand jury has been termed "the fifth wheel in the judicial machinery,"
and the "rubber stamp of the prosecuting attorney." If, in many
instances, it was the fifth wheel or rubber stamp, such need not have been
the situation. By the common law and by statutory law, the grand jury
has extraordinary powers for setting the machinery of investigation and
justice in motion, regardless of the wishes of public prosecutors or
22 See statute, supra, note 2.
23 Sternall v. Strand, -Cal. App.-, 172 P. (2d) 921 (1946).
24 The ordinance there made the possession of the machines illegal and the
statute provided that their operation was illegal. California cases are complicated
by the fact that the constitution prohibits co-ordinate state and local laws, so the
ordinance could not have provided exactly the same as the statute did. For an
explanation of the California rule see Grant, Penal Ordinances in California (1936)
24 Calif. L. Rev. 123.




judges.2 Having that broad power, its potential value in the enforce-
ment of the law cannot be overlooked, but it is the lack of understanding
of this power that has caused the present inertia and the resulting attacks
on the system. The need, therefore, is for better informedgrand juries.
The judiciary is to blame, in most instances, for the prevailing ignor-
ance of grand juries regarding their full powers. On one occasion, a
judge in his charge to the grand jury3 put stress on an instruction to the
effect that the grand jury was prohibited from having communications
with anyone except the court and state's attorney and that it was im-
proper for anyone else to send communications to the jurors, or for the
jurors to receive them. Court attaches said the judge was directing his
attack at a pamphlet which had been mailed to the grand jurors instruct-
ing them as to their duties and powers. However, when a committee
called upon the judge in regard to the charge, he stated that he was
merely following the formal charge given for years, that he did not know
where it originated, and that after careful study he did not believe it
was the law because it tended to limit the powers of the grand jury and
give too much influence to the state's attorney. The judge also said he
had no thought of criticizing the pamphlet, but instead commended it as
supplementary to his own charge.
4
The exact extent to which the grand jury can communicate with or
receive communications from private individuals has been a question on
which the courts have disagreed to a marked extent. The grand jury in
its modern form probably dates back to the time of the "Inquisito"
introduced by King William the Conqueror in England. He initiated
the practice of assembling certain men of the vicinity to make inquiry of
them as to crimes and criminal suspects in the district. Originally this
same body both accused and tried persons, but eventually there developed
a separation between the trial (petit) and accusing (grand) jury. When
the "justices of the peace" came into being, they for several centuries
largely supplanted the grand jury as the primary investigatory body and
the grand jury began to rely less on its own knowledge and more on
evidence taken before it.5
During the growth of the grand jury in England, it pdrformed two
important services in criminal procedure: (1) it presented for prosecu-
2 In instructions to grand jury in the United States District Court for Northern
District of Illinois, November 1, 1915, the jury was told that the court and district
attorney would advise them as to the law but that they were free to follow their
own judgment as to what should or should not be done; they were free to get evi-
dence and information from any source and were not to be hampered by the ordinary
legal rules. See Comment (1932) 10 The Panel 31. The court cannot limit the
scope of the investigation. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1920) ;
People v. Blumfield, 330 Ill. 474, 161 N.E. 857 (1928); People ex rel Ferrill v.
Graydon, 333 Ill. 429, 164 N.E. 832 (1929).
3 The charge prohibited the grand jurors from holding communication with any-
one except the court, the state's attorney, such witnesses as were sent before them
by the state's attorney, and fellow jurors. It also stated it was improper for any-
one else to send communications to the grand jurors or for them to receive such
communications, whether with a view to influencing their action or not.
410 The Panel 30 (1932) quoting from The Chicago Tribune, September 3,
1930 and The Chicago Daily News, September 17, 1930.
5 Holdsworth, History of English Law, (1871).; McKecknie, Magna Carta,
(1905); Pollock and Maitland, History of the English Law, (1895); Stephen, His-
tory of the Criminal Law, (1834); Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence
(1896); 5 The Panel 1 (1927).
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tion individuals who of its own knowledge it knew or had reason to
believe were guilty of criminal offenses; and (2) it served as a check
upon the powers of the government to imprison without trial those who
opposed its regime.6. While the present day grand jury still retains
these important functions, the success of the grand juries in New York
County, New York during the last fifteen years, the Cuyahoga County
(Cleveland), Ohio grand jury of September-December 1933 and many
others indicates that under proper guidance the prosecution element is
currently the more important from the public standpoiit.7
If this first important function of the grand jury is to have its full
effectiveness, the jurors must have a knowledge of matters in the com-
munity which need investigation, a full understanding of their complete
powers of investigation and of their duty to exercise those powers. Two
questions are therefore pertinent: (1) Can a citizen or group of citizens
inform the grand jury of crimes that have been committed?, and (2)
can a citizen or group of citizens inform the grand jury of its powers
and duties? Since most states have not covered this specifically in either
their constitutions or statutes, the possibility of private citizens com-
municating with grand juries remains as it was at common law except
where the courts have limited those contacts through their decisions.
Private communications to a grand jury were severely restricted by
Mr. Justice Field in 1872 when he instructed a grand jury8 that its
investigations were to be limited to matters called to its attention by the
court or submitted by the district attorney, or to matters based on its
own observations and knowledge. Justice Field expressed the opinion
that private prosecutors were generally actuated by private enmity or
malice and that if the court or district attorney did not think the matter
of sufficient importance to submit it to the grand jury, justice would not
suffer if the matter were not acted upon. Limitations to this effect were
expressly adopted in a few states by statute,9 and in Pennsylvania by
judicial decision.10
A common error made by the courts in investigating contempt charges
for interference with the grand jury has been their failure to differen-
tiate between original charges brought before the grand jury and com-
munications addressed to it in relation to cases already under considera-
tion. At common law, the grand jury had the power to prefer indictments
6 It was the attempt of the King to dictate to the grand juries which hastened
the downfall of the Stuarts in England in 1688. The grand jurors of Middlesex in
1681 refused to indict Lord Shaftsbury at the wishes of Charles Il, and when the
Lord Chief Justice berated them for their action, he was taken before the bar of
the House and told never again to attempt to coerce a grand jury.
7 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 Fed. Supp. 283 (1933).
8 30 Fed. Cas. 992 (1872). The charge of Mr. Justice Field in this case is now
sustained in the Federal Courts by Statute, 35, Stat. 1113, 18 USCA § 241 (1909).
Cf. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1920); Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273 (1919); Carrol v. United States, 16 F(2d) 951, (CCA 2d, 1927); Hen-
dricks v. United States, 223 U.S. 178 (1912); United States v. McGovern, 60 F(2d)
880 (1932).
912 The Panel 32 (1934).
10 McCullough v. Commonwealth, 67 Pa. 30 (1870) ; State v. Love, 23 Tenn. 255
(1843). Cf. Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) where the court quotes from Frisbie
v. United States, 153 U.S. 160 (1896) the following: "It is for the grand jury to
investigate any alleged crime, no matter how or by whom suggested to them."
There is no authority in the English common law for these restrictions on the grand
jury. Regina v. Russell, Car. & M. 247, 174 Eng. Rep. R. 492 (1841); Regina v.
Bullard, 12 Cox Cr. Ca. 353 (1872).
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at the instance of private prosecutors." In the United States some cases
have held and other courts have stated by way of dictum that an indi-
vidual has the right to present a charge of an offense not theretofore
brought to the attention of the grand jury or considered by that body
through ordinary channels. 12 The decisions do not mean that every
communication would be free from contempt 13 if the communication were
predicated by malice or personal enmity,14 or if it were done with the
intention of interfering with the grand jury in its handling of matters
properly before it.15 In People v. Parker,16 the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected the contention of the state that any communication was con-
temptuous, but upheld a contempt conviction where the communication on
its face showed malice and personal enmity. Previously, in People ex rel
Ferrill v. Graydon,17 the same court had held that the duty of the grandjury was to inquire into all offenses which came to its knowledge from
the court, its own members, the state's attorney, or from any source. If
the court in the Parker case had accepted the position taken by the state,
no effect could have been given to the words "or from any source."
Since the grand jury is not to try the case but merely to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence on which to bring the defendant to
trial, any communication by the defendant is an interference with the
"1People v. Sheridan, 349 fll. 202, 181 N.E. 617 (1932); People ex rel Ferrill
v. Graydon, 333 Ill. 429, 164 N.E. 832 (1929); Blaney v. State, 74 Md. 153, 21
Atl. 547 (1891) ; Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40-A(2d) 319, (1944) ; In re Opinion
to Governor, 62 R.I. 200, 4 A(2d) 487, (1939); Thompson & Merriam, Juries § 609(1882).
12 King v. Second Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 234 Ala. 106, 173 So. 498 (1937) ; in
re Lester, 77 Ga. 143 (1886); State v. Stewart, 45 La. Ann. 1164, 14 So. 143 (1893);
State v. Sullivan, 159 La. 589, 105 So. 631 (1925); Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86,
40 A(2d) 319 (1944). Hott v. Yarborough, 112 Tex. 179, 245 S.W. 676 (1922),
also followed this rule under specific statute.
13 Cases of perjury charges against witnesses for false swearing before the grandjury may throw additional light on the subject. In Alt v. State, 83 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 337, 203 S.W. 53 (1918), the court held that a witness could not be convicted
of perjury for false swearing before a grand jury where it did not appear that
the testimony in question was given in regard to any criminal matter or offense, or
that it could form the basis of a criminal charge which the grand jury was in-
vestigating, or that the grand jury was examining into any particular offense. The
court held that there could be no contempt for there was nothing in the statement
material to an issue or point in question. See also Smith v. State, 153 Ark. 645, 241
S.W. 37 (1922) ; State v. Keller, 193 Ind. 619, 141 N.E. 337 (1923) ; State v. Ruddy,287 Mo. 52, 228 S.W. 760 (1921); State v. Ackerman, 214 Mo. 325, 113 S.W. 1087
(1908).
14 People v. Parker, 374 111. 524, 30 N.E. (2d) 11 (1940). While the language
used in the case would seem to imply that any communication with the grand jury
was contemptuous, the court found malice in the communication here involved. People
v. Doss, 382 Ill. 307, 46 N.E. (2d) 984 (1943) is cited for the proposition that
accusations couched in such general language that they serve .no useful purpose but
show personal enmity constitute contempt as an unauthorized interference with the
administration of justice. The Doss case also cites Commonwealth v. McNary, 246
Mass. 82, 140 N.E. 255 (1923) as standing for this proposition. See comment (1941)
8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 561, where the conclusion is reached that People v. Parker did
not change the common law in Illinois.
15 In re Taylor, 64 Cal. 434, 1 Pac. 884 (1884) ; Ex Parte Shuler, 210 Cal. 377,
291 Pac. 481 (1930); Joselyn v. People, 67 Col. 297, 184 Pac. 375 (1919); Bishop,
Criminal Law (1923) § 216.
16 People v. Parker, 374 1ll. 524, 30 N.E. (2d) 11 (1940).
17 333 Ill. 429, 164 N.E. 832 (1929).
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course of the investigation and constitutes contempt.' 8 It is apparent,
therefore, that where the common law is still in force, a private individual
may not only communicate his knowledge of a crime to the grand jury
but is obliged to do so.
The propriety of communications designed to inform grand jurors
solely of their broad powers and duties has seldom come before the
courts. Ex parte Pease,'9 a Texas case, is probably the clearest instance
in which contempt charges were brought in such a situation. The de-
fendant had published an editorial entitled "Grand Juries" which con-
sisted entirely of abstract statements of the high duties of grand juries
and a statement of the resulting dangers, evils and hurtful consequences
when such officials were not moved by disinterested and pure motives.
No reference was made to any particular grand jury. The court in dis-
charging the defendant said: "We confess ourselves unable to find any-
thing which might not have been appropriately read to his grand jury
by any judge of any court upon their enpanelment." An Indiana case,
Cheadle v. State,20 reached the same conclusions. Other courts have said
by way of dictum that where there has been actual interference with the
grand jury in a case pending before it, any communications other than
through the court's officials or anyone properly before the grand jury
would constitute contempt. However, there apparently are no cases,
decided upon common law principles, holding contemptuous a communi-
cation to the grand jury which only contained information as to the
powers of grand juries. In the Illinois case of People v. Jordan,2 ' and
the New York cases of People v. Shea22 and People v. SellniCk,2 3 the
indictments were attacked on the ground that persons other than the
court had instructed the grand jury. The courts in these cases refused
to set aside the indictments on that ground, saying that the defendants
would have to s'how some prejudice to them from the instructions.
In 1907 a group of citizens in New York organized a Grand Jury
Association for the purpose of better informing grand jurors of their
powers and duties. Since that time, the Association has prepared and
18Edwards, The Grand Jury (1906). The author states on p. 103 that "In
making their inquiries, the grand jurors are not permitted to summon witnesses
for the defense either upon their own motion or at the request of the defendant
or his counsel, or will the court allow the defendant's witnesses to go before the
grand jury either with or without the consent of the district attorney, or may any
witness appear before or send any communication to them, pertaining to a matter
then pending before the grand jury, except upon previous order of the court."
Citing authorities for each point. By statute, New York in 1940 allowed defendants
to appear before the grand jury in certain cases. Code of Criminal Procedure § 255,
§ 257. Laws of New York, 1940, Ch. 643, § 257.
19 Tex. Cr. App., 57 S.W. (2d) 575 (1933).
20 110 Ind. 201, 11 N.E. 426 (1887).
21 292 Ill. 514, 127 N.E. 117 (1920). Here the state's attorney rather than the
court had instructed the grand jury. The court held that unless prejudice could be
shown to the defendant, the indictment would not be set aside on that issue alone.
22 147 N. Y. 78, 41 N.E. 505 (1895). Defendant moved to dismiss indictment.
Certain persons, not officers of the law, had distributed to each person on the grandjury list a circular letter advising them as to their duties. Motion denied. On
appeal, Court of Appeals refused dismissal unless he could show some prejudice
toward him had had resulted from the committee's action.
23 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 329 (1886). Attorney for complainant sent cards to the grand
jurors. The court said that the indictment would be set aside because of improper
influence brought to bear upon grand jurors, but made clear that it was pressure
brought to bear to indict, not the instruction as to powers and duties, which caused
the reversal.
19471
